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Real Nudge
Luc Bovens*
The novelty in Adam Burgess’ paper is that he assesses nudge policies in the context of the 
shift in the UK government’s approach to risk from the nannying policies of Labour to the 
nudge policies of the Conservatives. There is a wealth of ideas in this paper. I find it useful 
to disentangle some of these ideas focusing on the following two questions:
1.  In what respects do Labour’s nannying policies and the Conservatives’ nudge policies 
differ?
2. What is problematic about Labour’s nannying and the Conservatives’ nudge policies?
Subsequently I will reflect on how a particular strand of research in the social sciences can 
be made relevant to designing a more responsible way of dealing with societal risk and 
show how this approach can evade some of Burgess’ concerns. 
I.  Differences between nannying  
and nudge
1.  Regulation and economic incentives 
versus behavioural modification
Nannying involves regulation to reduce the option set 
by legislating against risky behaviour or it provides 
economic incentives and disincentives to make risky 
behaviour more costly (be it through accounting 
costs or through opportunity costs). Nudge aims to 
change the choice architecture, i.e. the environment 
in which the choice is made, so that people who are 
placed in this environment would be less likely to 
display risky behaviour. 
2. Rational versus a-rational agents
Nannying rests on the assumption that people behave 
rationally: a rational agent will avoid risky behaviour 
when it is met with punitive measures or when it 
becomes more costly. Nudge rests on the assumption 
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that people behave a-rationally: an a-rational agent 
changes her behaviour conditioned by environmen-
tal cues that she would not be affected by if she were 
a fully rational agent.  
3.  Centralised, bureaucratic and costly 
interventions versus small scale, 
osmotic and cheap interventions
Nannying is top-down, requires bureaucratic over-
sight and is costly in terms of public funding. Nudge 
is bottom-up – it aims to inspire local communities to 
institute changes in choice environments and to em-
ulate successful initiatives. This approach requires 
less public funding. 
4.  Scare tactics versus social norm 
enforcement through conformity
Nannying intervenes by exaggerating the prevalence 
and the negative consequences of the risky behav-
iour. This is in contrast to one particular nudge 
strategy which intervenes by drawing attention to 
the fact that the majority of the population does 
not engage in risky behaviour implying that this is 
the social norm. This nudge strategy aims to bring 
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about behavioural change by tapping into the com-
mon psychological disposition to conform to social 
norms.  
5.  Non-laboratory science as evidence 
base versus laboratory science as 
evidence base
Nannying is based on evidence that is gathered in 
the field. This may include evidence about the con-
sequences of risky behaviour (as studied, say, in epi-
demiology) or evidence about the success of certain 
interventions to restrict risky behaviour by changing 
rational expectations (as studied in neoclassical eco-
nomics). Nudge relies on evidence about how chang-
es in the environment can bring about behavioural 
modification through a-rational processes. This kind 
of evidence is typically obtained through laboratory 
experiments conducted by psychologists and behav-
ioural economists.   
6.  Adversarial versus cooperative 
relationship with industry
Nannying’s relationship with industry is adversarial 
in that it imposes restrictions on production and 
sales through regulation. Nudge engages industry 
by coaxing them to institute changes in the choice 
environment that bring about desirable behavioural 
modifications. 
II.   Critiques of Labour’s and the 
Conservatives’ policies
Burgess raises a number of critiques. Some of them 
address risk policies in general and apply equally to 
nannying and nudge whereas others are specific to 
nannying or to nudge.    
1. Politicising risk
The government is overly eager to identify risk in 
society and may even invent risk factors in order to 
create the illusion of being proactive in dealing with 
societal problems. This critique applies both to nan-
nying and nudge.    
2. Invasion of privacy
The government transgresses its mandate by inter-
vening in matters that belong to a person’s private 
sphere. This critique applies both to nannying and 
nudge.    
 3. Threat to liberty
Nannying and nudge both pose a threat to liberty. 
But they do so in different ways. Nannying reduces 
liberty by reducing the option set or by rearranging 
our preferences over the option set through adjusting 
costs and benefits. Nudge poses a threat to liberty as 
autonomy. It aims to modify behaviour by appealing 
to a-rational processes. A person who is subject to 
such a-rational processes is not fully in control of her 
agency and hence does not act in a fully autonomous 
manner.  
4. Unintended side effects
We do not fully understand how interventions will 
affect behaviour and how behaviour will affect out-
comes. This kind of critique applies both to nannying 
and nudge. In the case of nannying, interventions 
may not work because agents may not respond ra-
tionally or because we do not fully understand the 
agents’ belief and desire structures. In the case of 
nudge, certain behavioural mechanisms identified 
in the laboratory may not transpose to real-world 
decision-making. Furthermore, even if we are able 
to bring about the targeted behaviour, either through 
nannying or nudge, the behavioural change may fail 
to bring about the expected outcomes.  
5. Infantilisation
An unintended side effect that deserves special at-
tention is the issue of infantilisation and the hin-
drance of moral development. Both nannying and 
nudge may have this effect. Regulation as well as 
environmental cues to discourage or encourage cer-
tain behaviour may leave the agent with a lack of 
moral strength to implement the target behaviour 
once the regulation or the environmental cues are 
no longer present.  
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6. Corruptibility
Nannying is corruptible in that it may lead to gov-
ernment sanctioned bureaucratic sprawl. Nudge may 
be exploited by self-interested commercial actors or 
may become mere window-dressing for the govern-
ment to do nothing about issues of risk in times of 
austerity. 
III. Ways forward: Real nudge 
I wish to make a plea for more social science research 
in which outcomes of risk behaviours are compared 
across relevantly similar societies. For example, rates 
of biking accidents, liver disease, diabetes, suicide…
could be compared between EU member states. 
Mechanisms that may be causally responsible for 
these differences could then be identified through 
causal search techniques. Such mechanisms may be 
cultural features, legislation, economic incentives, 
features in the choice architecture etc. Some of these 
mechanisms may be transposable, some may not be 
transposable. Insight in the causal mechanisms that 
bring about these differences in outcomes permits us 
to make informed choices about whether interven-
tion from the government is advisable and what kind 
of intervention would be most effective.  
Comparative causal efficacy studies of regulation 
and economic incentives are of course commonplace 
in social policy studies. What is novel here is that 
I propose to search for features of the choice archi-
tecture that are causally responsible for differences 
in risk behaviours across comparable societies. I 
propose to name this approach ‘Real Nudge’, since 
we focus on choice architecture differences that are 
operative in real-world contexts (and not on policy 
initiatives that find their inspiration in laboratory 
experiments). 
What are the advantages of such an approach?
1. Real risks
Risk management would become less politicised. 
It is no longer possible for the government to con-
coct risks out of thin air and to implement needless 
1 Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge – Improving Decisions 
about Health, Wealth and Happiness (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2008).
policies to give the impression of being proactive. 
What qualifies as risk-to-be-managed must be under-
pinned by cross-cultural differences. There is a prima 
facie cause for concern for certain problem behav-
iours in our own society only if we can show that we 
have alarmingly high rates of undesirable outcomes 
caused by these problem behaviours relative to socie-
ties that are similar to ours in many other respects.  
2. Non-ideological solutions
The tension between nannying and nudge is entan-
gled in an unproductive ideological debate about 
the role and scope of government. An appeal to this 
strand of research in the social sciences to support 
policy making is non-ideological and does not fa-
vour nannying or nudge. Whatever works – be it a 
mechanism based on regulation or tweaking choice 
architectures – is open for consideration as a policy 
measure to be implemented. 
3. Solutions that work
Burgess objects that many of Labour’s laws and regu-
lations to manage risk are ineffective. If we restrict 
the examples in Thaler and Sunstein1 to examples 
that genuinely qualify as real-life successful nudges 
then we are left with a rather small and anaemic 
set. Furthermore, there is little reason to believe 
that nudge policies that are inspired by research 
on behavioural patterns observed in the laboratory 
would be successful in the real world. The advan-
tage of starting from actual outcome differences and 
uncovering causal mechanisms that produce these 
outcome differences is that these mechanisms have 
at least some proven track record.     
4. Managing transposability
Granted, these causal mechanisms may not be trans-
posable. First, they may include deeply-seeded cul-
tural differences that are simply not transposable. 
Second, they may be effective in one context and 
ineffective in other contexts. And third, they may 
have unintended side effects when transposed to 
other contexts. But having seen them in operation in 
some societal contexts should be at least somewhat 
informative and encouraging. The bridge between 
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relatively similar societies is expected to be less wide 
than the bridge between rational choice models (for 
nannying) and the laboratory (for nudge) on the one 
hand and the real world on the other hand. But clear-
ly, the issue of transposability will need to be decided 
on a case by case basis with a sensitivity for cultural 
singularities and through cautious and small scale 
experimentation. 
5. Privacy and Liberty
As to privacy and liberty issues, comparative studies 
between countries that are roughly similar in their 
respect for civil rights have a creative potential of 
revealing mechanisms that are minimally invasive. 
Certainly, what may pass the bar of respecting pri-
vacy and liberty in one liberal democracy may not in 
another due to cultural differences. Again, this is an 
issue to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
How would this work in practice? Think of alco-
hol policy. There is a range of studies that try to link 
government policies about alcohol pricing, advertis-
ing, availability … to alcohol consumption rates and 
patterns and to alcohol-related morbidity and mor-
tality rates across OECD countries.2 Policy changes 
should be maximally informed by such cross-cultur-
al studies. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to include 
features of the choice architecture of alcohol con-
sumption among the potential causes in such cross-
cultural studies. Are non-alcohol and low-alcohol 
beers made available in pubs and off-licences? Are 
they made available on tap (so that they can be 
consumed non-conspicuously) in pubs? What food 
choices are made available along with the beer? 
What are the serving sizes of drinks? Do custom-
ers pay at the time of the order or can they run up 
tabs? Do customers pay for themselves or is there a 
culture of rounds? What feedback is made available 
e.g. through alcohol content labelling and through 
the sale of breathalyzers? Do any of these choice ar-
chitecture features causally affect alcohol consump-
tion rates and patterns and alcohol-related morbid-
ity and mortality rates? Nudge initiatives should be 
informed and backed up by such studies.  
Similar cross-cultural effectiveness studies of 
nannying and nudge policies could be carried out in 
areas of energy consumption, littering, obesity, edu-
cation, integration of ethnic minorities … Such stud-
ies (and not ideological commitments to the proper 
role and scope of government or philosophical views 
about the nature of human agency) should provide 
the backbone for policy initiatives. 
2 See, e.g., Donald A. Brand, Michaela Saisana, Lisa A. Rynn et al., 
“Comparative Analysis of Alcohol Control Policies in 30 Countries”, 
4(4) PLoS (2007), pp. 752–759; Alison Ritter “Comparing Alcohol 
Policies between Countries – Science or Silliness?”, 4(4) PLoS 
(2007), pp. 616–619; Nick Sheron, Chris Hawkey and Ian Gilmore, 
“Projections of Alcohol Deaths: A Wake-Up Call”, 377 The Lancet 
(2011), pp. 1297–1299.
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